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a b s t r a c t
The economic crisis in Spain (2008–2012) led to a massive decrease in the feed-in tariff on photovoltaic
solar energy production, which caused stagnation in the growth of this market. The objective of
this paper is to analyze how institutional changes have affected the structure of the market; for this
purpose, concentration and stability indices have been calculated. The analysis period is from 2004
to 2018 and data from 5,353 firms in the sector have been used. The results of the analysis show
that the incentive policy increased the degree of competition and attracted mostly small companies.
This was due to the profitability guaranteed by the premiums. Despite the progressive decrease in
the number of companies since the cancellation of the premium policy, concentration in the sector
is low. However, from 2016 onwards there has been an increase in the degree of concentration. This
is because we are facing the beginning of a new photovoltaic "boom" in Spain, this time led by large
companies, attracted both by a new legislative turn and by the low costs of photovoltaic technology.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In the last decade of the 20th century, the progressive deple-
tion of fossil fuels and the growing concern for environmental
conservation, there has been a change in energy policies (Covert
t al., 2016; Kittner et al., 2017). These factors, together with
technological improvements in the energy sector, have stim-
ulated policies to promote renewable energy in Europe (Blok,
2006; Saint Akadiri et al., 2019; Li et al., 2020). Spain is one
of the European countries with the best climate conditions for
photovoltaic energy production (Carrión et al., 2008; Spanish
hotovoltaic Union (UNEF), 2016). The number of hours of so-
ar radiation in Spain far exceeds that of the largest European
roducer, Germany (Šúri et al., 2007).
Since 2007, Spain has established an aggressive policy of in-
entives for solar energy. This led to disproportionate growth
n photovoltaic production, which reached 300% year-on-year
rowth rates (Movilla et al., 2013). In 2007, the generation of
hotovoltaic solar electricity in Spain was 507.0 GWh and grew to
each 8193.0 GWh in 2010, stabilizing at the current 7512 GWh
enerated in 2018 (International Energy Agency (IEA), 2019).
he economic crisis and the risk of foreign intervention in the
panish economy during the spring of 2010 made the Spanish
tate implement an adjustment policy that slowed down the
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: elena.arce@udc.es (E. Arce).https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2021.05.021
2352-4847/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access abonus policy (Fernández-González et al., 2020). Thus, as the crisis
affected the country, the Spanish government’s budgets reflected
new distribution priorities (Mahalingam and Reiner, 2016). Al-
though this change in public policy did not affect the property
rights of the agents, it involved a change in the possibilities of
return on investment. Within transactional policy, this is clearly
a hold-up problem of an irreversible investment, as classified
by Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) or Williamson (2007). The ex-
ante conditions on investment returns were not met, since the
government changed the institutional framework ex-post, elimi-
nating investment returns and making it impossible for investors
to recover their investments (Álvarez-Díaz et al., 2017).
The photovoltaic sector in Spain has attracted the attention of
academy. Many studies address different aspects of this industry
in Spain, such as the production performance of large solar energy
production plants (Carrión et al., 2008; Martín-Martínez et al.,
2019; Talavera et al., 2015), the implementation of solar energy
at households (Prol and Steininger, 2017; Ordóñez et al., 2010;
Rosales-Asensio et al., 2019; Tanil and Jurek, 2020), the compar-
ative analysis between the Spanish and European markets (Tanil
and Jurek, 2020; Prol, 2018; Sarasa-Maestro et al., 2013) and the
governance of this sector (Mir-Artigues, 2013; Mir-Artigues and
Del Río, 2016). However, a concentration analysis reflecting the
changes in the business structure of this sector has not been
carried out.
This paper analyzes how institutional change in the pho-
tovoltaic sector has affected the degree of concentration andrticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).























































Ck Weight of the largest ‘‘k’’ companies
CNMC National Commission for Markets and Com-
petition
CNE National Energy Commission
DI Dominance Index
GEntryR Gross entry rate
GExitR Gross exit rate
HHI Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
HHI-S Herfindahl–Hirschman standardized index
I Instability and volatility index
K Kwoka dominance index
MR Market rotation rate
NEntryR Net entry rate
R Inverse number of companies
RD Royal Decree
RD-L Royal Decree Law
RHT Rosenbluth, Hall & Tideman Index
SABI Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System
stability of the sector and what factors have influenced the level
of competition. The aim of this research is to find out the degree
of concentration and consolidation of the Spanish photovoltaic
sector and what its future prospects are.
The study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the in-
stitutional structure of the sector. Section 3 sets out the method-
ology used to carry out the empirical analysis of the photovoltaic
sector. Section 4 analyzes the results of the degree of concen-
tration and stability, and its evolution in the face of institutional
change. The conclusions of this study are provided in Section 5.
. Legislative framework of the Spanish photovoltaic sector
It was not until 2007 that the photovoltaic sector took off in
pain. This was due to the lower cost of solar technology, the
redit facilities for the sector promoted by the banking system,
he shift in investment flows from the building sector to the
hotovoltaic solar energy sector and the proliferation of distribu-
ion and grid connection companies (Mir-Artigues et al., 2015).
espite the importance of these factors, the trigger for the sec-
or’s growth was the change in premium policy in 2007. In the
ollowing sections, we will analyze the trends in the legislative
ramework and how this framework modified the behavior of the
gents involved in it (See Fig. 1).
.1. The expansion of the sector
The exponential growth of the photovoltaic sector was due to
he entry into force of RD 436/2004 (2004), passed on 12 March
004. The objective of this Royal Decree was to unify existing
egulations on renewable energy (de la Hoz et al., 2012). It sought
o define a framework that would be conducive to the renewal
f the legal and economic system related to the production of
enewable energy, paying particular attention to installations.
his tariff system was based on RD 2818/1998 (Spanish Ministry
f Industry and Energy, 1998) and RD 841/2002 (Spanish Ministry
of Economy, 2002) and, as a novelty, it established two channels
of remuneration of free choice for the producer. The first of these
remuneration methods gave the owner of the installation the
option to trade with the electricity companies on its produc-
tion or surplus, receiving a proportion of the average electricity
2941tariff (De la Hoz et al., 2010). The second way of remuneration
was based on the sale of the production or surplus to the daily
market, without intermediaries. Another important point of RD
436/2004 (Spanish Ministry of Economy, 2004) was to guarantee
the sustainability and profitability of the installations throughout
their useful life and to extend the application of the premiums
to 100 kW installations, as it previously only covered 5 kW
installations (Salas and Olias, 2009).
The real boost to the sector came with the passing of RD
61/2007 (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce,
2007). Although it maintained the dual remuneration system for
production implemented in 2004 and explained above, it created
the bottom-top system, which guaranteed a minimum return for
photovoltaic companies during the entire lifetime of the plant.
Annually, until 2010, the limit amounts would be reviewed based
on the Consumer Price Index. From 2010 onwards, reviews would
be carried out every four years (del Río González, 2008). In
addition, RD 661/2007 (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and
Commerce, 2007) established a limit on the amount of installed
capacity to support the premium system, namely 371 MW. If
85% of the installed power limit was reached, the tariffs would
be changed (Mir-Artigues, 2013). It should be noted that in May
007, production was already close to 71% of the limit (263 MW
ver the 371 MW limit).
The new legislative framework attracted new producers and
nvestors, making solar PV power grow exponentially (see Fig. 2).
n 2008, the annual rate of change of PV power production in-
reased by more than 440% (Álvarez-Díaz et al., 2017). In addition,
n 2008 the relative weight of photovoltaic energy in the re-
ewable energy mix quadrupled. Thus, according to data from
he REE (Spanish Electricity Network (REE), 2010), in October
007 photovoltaic energy production was 521 MW, exceeding the
imit of 371 MW established by RD 661/2007 (Spanish Ministry
f Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2007) by 40%. One year
ater, in October 2008, production exceeded the limit of 371 MW
y 900% (Mir-Artigues and Del Río, 2016). As Fig. 2 shows, the
umber of installations, although still growing, has slowed down
ince the 2008 boom. The latest available data for 2019 show that
ince 2012 the number of installations has only increased by 2.6%.
The National Markets and Competition Commission (CNMC),
ormerly the National Energy Commission (CNE), defines the
pecial regime as the production of electricity with renewable
ources, waste or cogeneration, whose installed capacity does not
xceed 50 MW. In 2016, 35% of all electricity generated in Spain
as under the special regime. Except in specific cases, it is not
ompetitive and its existence is due to the fact that it is subsidized
y premiums.
In the Spanish national context, photovoltaic solar energy is
he one that obtains more millions of annual remuneration, de-
pite the fact that its production is one of the smallest. In absolute
alues, it takes twice as much as wind power and produces one
ifth (National Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC),
020). This is due to the fact that its premium is 10 times that
f wind power. Solar FV, in 2018, collected a premium of more
han 2500 million euros for 7765 GWh, while wind energy, in
018, charged a premium of 1480 million euros for 36,143 GWh
4 ce/kWh or 40.9 euros/MWh) (National Commission for Mar-
kets and Competition (CNMC), 2020). Fig. 3 shows the evolution
of installed power, as well as remuneration, which over a period
of 10 years has been multiplied by 2.5. All of this is the result of
government policies initiated when José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero
was at the helm of the government, which his successors kept
going.
Fig. 4 shows the evolution of premium growth, which led to a
financially unsustainable situation. Thus, according to data from
the REE (Spanish Electricity Network (REE), 2010) and CNMC (Na-
tional Commission for Markets and Competition (CNMC), 2020),
R. Fernández-González, E. Arce and D. Garza-Gil Energy Reports 7 (2021) 2940–2949
Fig. 1. Graphic summary of the timeline of the regulations that affect the PV solar energy production sector and its impacts.
Source: Compiled by authors.
Fig. 2. Photovoltaic solar power total installations in Spain.
Source: Compiled by authors. Data from CNMC, 2020.
Fig. 3. Evolution of installed power and remuneration obtained from solar photovoltaic installations, 2007–2019.
Source: Compiled by authors. Data from CNMC, 2020.
Fig. 4. Premiums and contribution to the special mix of photovoltaic energy.
Source: Compiled by authors. Data from CNMC, 2020.
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n October 2007 photovoltaic energy production was 521 MW, ex-
eeding the limit of 371 MW established by RD 661/2007 (Spanish
inistry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2007) by 40%. One
ear later, in October 2008, production exceeded the limit of
71 MW by 900% (Álvarez-Díaz et al., 2017). The variability in the
olar PV contribution data is due to the sensitivity of production
o seasonality. The variability observed in the period analyzed is
n a range of 400 GWh (Spanish Electricity Network (REE), 2010).
.2. The contraction of the sector
The Spanish photovoltaic sector achieved such high growth
ates that, during 2008, the number of MW produced doubled
rom one quarter to the next. This phenomenon was brought
bout by the injection of public funds into the solar energy sector.
his situation ended up generating criticism from the rest of the
nergy sector, since it meant an inequality of opportunities, as
ell as a high cost for public finances in a crisis scenario (Blok,
006). Thus, the heavy burden of subsidies, coupled with the
hange of government in 2011, led to the passing of laws between
008 and 2014 to restrict the beneficial conditions of this sector.
As indicated above, the policy change began in 2008 with the
assing of RD 1578/2008 (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism
nd Commerce, 2008). In order to moderate the disproportionate
growth of the sector, this Royal Decree established a procedure of
quarterly calls to establish the price of the kWh received by the
producers, which were registered in the Pre-Reward Allocation
Register (Fernández-González et al., 2020). The reduction in pre-
iums contained in RD 1578/2008 (Spanish Ministry of Industry,
ourism and Commerce, 2008) and the imposition of a limit on
he number of projects benefiting from them led to a decrease in
nvestments in the sector.
Later, in 2010, three new pieces of legislation laws were
assed: RD 1003/2010 (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism
nd Commerce, 2010a), which regularized the payment of the
remium under the special scheme according to the date of op-
ration of the plant; RD 1565/2010 (Spanish Ministry of Industry,
ourism and Commerce, 2010b), which required the adoption
f various technological measures (1-MW plants had to send
elemetrics to the nearest System Operator and 2-MW plants
ad to be conditioned to withstand voltage dips); and RD-L
4/2010 (Spanish Head of State, 2010), which imposed a toll on
ccess to the electricity grid and reduced the equivalent hours
f operation during for which the plants benefited from the
hotovoltaic tariff. Following the passing of this new legislation,
he profitability of some photovoltaic companies was reduced by
p to 40% (Fernández-González et al., 2020). This measure made
t difficult for producers to meet their financial debts as most of
he plants had not yet been paid in full (Photovoltaic Industry
ssociation (ASIF), 2011).
In 2011, RD 1544/2011 (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism
nd Commerce, 2011a) and RD 1699/2011 (Spanish Ministry of
ndustry, Tourism and Commerce, 2011b) were passed, contin-
ing the trend of reducing premiums and making access to the
ector more difficult. RD 1544/2011 (Spanish Ministry of Industry,
ourism and Commerce, 2011a) established tolls for access to the
ransport and distribution networks. Specifically, it established a
ee of 0.5 euros/MWh for generating companies for the use of
he networks (Álvarez-Díaz et al., 2017). These new rates meant
0.2% increase in the costs of floor plants, while for panels
n buildings they would increase by 0.3%. RD 1544/2011 (Span-
sh Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2011a) was
ntended to discourage the creation of new companies by de-
reasing their profitability, now that it was recovering due to
he decrease in the price of solar panels. RD 1699/2011 (Spanish
inistry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2011b) encour-
ged the implementation of small power installations, to the2943detriment of those with a high number of panels. This other
measure was intended to change the profile of the sector: more
facilities for self-consumption and fewer ‘‘solar farms’’ with a high
concentration of solar panels.
The passing of RD 1544/2011 (Spanish Ministry of Industry,
Tourism and Commerce, 2011a) and RD 1699/2011 (Spanish Min-
istry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2011b) paved the way
for the dismantling of the premium system, but it was RD-L
1/2012 (Spanish Head of State, 2012) that determined the end of
this stage. RD-L 1/2012 (Spanish Head of State, 2012) was passed
by urgent procedure and was based on the need to approve
definitive measures to paralyze the Spanish budget deficit (Span-
ish Photovoltaic Union (UNEF), 2014). With its passing, the tariffs,
premiums and supplements for efficiency and reactive energy
were halted indefinitely. Although all the companies in the sec-
tor were negatively affected by RD-L 1/2012 (Spanish Head of
State, 2012), those facilities that were not registered in the Pre-
Allocation Register by 28 January 2012 were most affected, since
the 550-MW quota assigned for 2012 was removed (Álvarez-Díaz
et al., 2017). Therefore, the year-on-year growth of the sector in
2013 and 2014 fell alarmingly (2.34% and 0.16%, respectively).
To appreciate the magnitude of this decline, it is important to
emphasize that the same rates for 2010 and 2011 showed values
above 10%.
RD-L 2/2013 (Spanish Head of State, 2013a), on urgent mea-
sures in the electricity system and the financial sector, annulled
the double remuneration system established by RD
436/2004 (Spanish Ministry of Economy, 2004) and consolidated
in RD 661/2007 (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Com-
merce, 2007). Thus, the passing of RD-L 2/2013 (2013) carried on
with the dismantling of the premium system (Álvarez-Díaz et al.,
2017). From 2013 onwards the producer had to choose exclu-
sively between entering the market and receiving a compensatory
premium in case of losses (Ciarreta et al., 2011). This measure led
to the value of the production tax on electricity, 7% of the KW
generated, being borne by the producer (de la Hoz et al., 2014).
Due to the new measures implemented, the average prof-
itability of the sector decreased (Ramírez et al., 2017). In fact,
in 2013 it presented a deficit of 26 billion euros, undermining
the appeal of the sector. The destruction of jobs, the slowdown
in the creation of companies and the stagnation of production in
the sector led to the passing of RD-L 9/2013 in July 2013 (Spanish
Head of State, 2013b), with more favorable proposals for the
sector (del Río et al., 2015). RD-L 9/2013 (Blanco-Díez et al.,
2020) established the specific remuneration system, replacing
the previous system contained in RD 661/2007 (Spanish Ministry
of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2007), which guaranteed
a minimum profitability of 7.5% for all those companies with
a negative balance between their sales and investment costs.
This Royal Decree was complemented a posteriori with the pass-
ing of RD 413/2014 (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy and
Tourism, 2014a) and Order IET/1045/2014 (Spanish Ministry of
Industry, Energy and Tourism, 2014b), which contributed two
specific characteristics to the specific remuneration system: the
former sought to cover unamortized investment costs and the lat-
ter sought to compensate for energy costs that were not covered
by sale (Talavera et al., 2016).
In 2015, RD 900/2015 (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy
and Tourism, 2015) was passed, which turned out to be another
unfavorable regulation for the photovoltaic sector. RD
900/2015 (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism,
2015) contained the so-called ‘‘sun tax’’ which obliged self-
consumers of photovoltaic energy to pay a tax to contribute to the
Spanish electricity system. This new legislation led to stagnation
in low-power building installations (Ibarloza et al., 2018). Nu-
merous allegations were made against this RD (Spanish Ministry







f Industry, Energy and Tourism, 2015), as it was a barrier to
onsumption. One of them, presented by the regional government
f Catalonia, was the one processed by the Spanish Constitutional
ourt, which led to the annulment of the ban on self-consumption
f electricity in neighborhood associations in 2007 (Spanish Pho-
ovoltaic Union (UNEF), 2015). The Constitutional Court’s ruling
was the first step in removing the obstacles to self-consumption.
The definitive step was taken by RD-L15/2018 (Spanish Head of
State, 2018), passed after a change of government, which sim-
plified the procedures for self-consumption facilities, approved
economic compensation for surplus clean energy and definitively
repealed the ‘‘sun tax’’. In this way, it is possible to take advantage
of the economies of scale derived from the consumption of
photovoltaic energy in community homes. Therefore, since 2017
the photovoltaic sector is experiencing a new growth.
3. Methodology
Concentration and stability ratios make it possible to observe
the structural characteristics of the market in a simple manner,
which are then used in models that try to explain the level of
competition in the industry as a result of the structure of the
market. In addition, concentration ratios can reflect the entry
or exit of companies into and out of the market, or mergers
between established companies. This feature is, for example, used
in anti-trust legislation in the USA.
Data on Spanish companies in the photovoltaic energy sector
were obtained from the SABI (Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis
System) database belonging to the Bureau van Dijk Group. From
SABI it is possible to access the financial accounts of 2.6 million
Spanish and 800,000 Portuguese companies from 1993 to the
present year (Ibarloza et al., 2018). The group of companies
analyzed was defined using these search parameters:
• Country: Spain.
• Operating income (thousands of euros) min = 0.001 for at
least one of the years 2004–2019.
• IAE (Tax on Economic Activities) classification (only pri-
mary codes): 1514- ‘‘Production of energy from tides, solar
energy, etc.’’.
• CNAE 2009 (Primary codes only): 3519- ‘‘Other types of
electric power production’’.
• Description of the activity: it had to include ‘‘solar’’ or ‘‘pho-
tovoltaic’’.
Finally, the sample is made up of a total of 5353 companies.
The company data collect both legal and financial information
and also reflect the administrative structure. However, due to the
scarcity of records on the number of workers in each company,
this variable has not been included in the analysis. The data
obtained from SABI were analyzed on the basis of concentration
and stability ratios. This type of tool allows the study of both
the structure of a market and the level of competition, as well
as reflecting the entry or exit of companies into and out of the
market.
There is general agreement that the elements of concentration
measurement in a market are based on the number of firms
and the distribution of firm size (inequality). In this paper, the





Where, si is the market share of the ith company, wi is the weight
assigned to each company’s market share in the index, and n is
the number of companies in the sector.2944The calculation system used allows, depending on the weight
given to the smaller companies, the analysis of temporary
changes in the distribution queue. Seven concentration indices
were applied and analyzed. The following is an overview of
the key ratios used, the method of calculation and how the
results are interpreted. There are a great number of concentration
indices for economic analysis, but there are no clear theoretical
fundamentals for choosing among the different tools. Tables A.1
and A.2 presented in Appendix summarize the concentration and
stability ratios used.
4. Results
A quantitative analysis of concentration and stability of the
sector was carried out with data obtained from SABI for the
period between 2004 and 2019.
As far as concentration indicators are concerned, the results of
these indices allow the impact of the institutional and regulatory
environment and the economic cycle on the sector to be analyzed.
The results of the indicators are shown in Table 1.
In general, the results of the concentration indicators show the
following:
- Since 2009, the number of companies in the sector has
been reduced due to the impact of government policies. This
decline was smooth for three years (period 2009–2011), but
with the cancellation of the feed-in tariff policy in 2012, it
has been accelerating. In 2018, the number of companies in
the sector is close to the number that existed in 2007 (see
the value of the concentration indicator R).
- The level of concentration has been decreased from 2004
to 2016. The recent institutional framework, a consequence
of the abolition of the ‘‘sun tax’’ and the passing of RD-L
15/2018 (2018), has increased concentration in the sector.
- Despite variations, the degree of concentration in the sector,
as of 2007, can be considered low.
From a more thorough analysis of the results, the following
lessons can be drawn:
- Policies based on feed-in-tariffs have resulted in no domi-
nant company in the sector. The drastic drop in the value
of CR1 in 2007, which continues until 2009, is noteworthy.
In 2010 and 2011 the market share of the main compa-
nies in the sector increased due to two reasons: the drop
in annual installed power and the limitation on the num-
ber of hours and rates imposed by RD 1003/2010 (Spanish
Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2010a) and
RD-L 14/2010 (Spanish Head of State, 2010). However, in
recent years the degree of concentration in the sector has
increased. A greater commitment of the Spanish executive
power (i.e. RD-L 15/2018 Spanish Head of State, 2018), the
beginning of the decarbonization of the Spanish economy
and the lowering of the costs of photovoltaic energy (Ibar-
loza et al., 2018) have attracted large companies. In the
last two years, the construction of large-scale photovoltaic
power plants by large companies has been a trend (Bullich-
Massagué et al., 2020). This type of installation has the
advantage of exploiting economies of scale, but it also in-
creases the degree of concentration in the sector. In this
new photovoltaic ‘‘boom’’, the support of foreign financial
institutions (e.g. Natixis S.A., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and
Société Générale S.A.) is key (Cinco Días and El País, 2020).
- The dominant companies in the sector (CR5 and CR10) in the
period 2004–2007 are either extinct or have dramatically
fallen in market share. The companies that lead the market
today did not exist before 2007. In the time series analyzed,
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Evolution of concentration indicators in the Spanish solar photovoltaic sector, 2004–2018.
R
Weight of the largest ‘‘k’’ companies
HHI HHI-S RHT DI KC1 C3 C5 C10
(%) (%) (%) (%)
2004 0.0084 75.2 85.8 92.7 98.3 5744.46 0.571 0.0646 0.969 0.4793
2005 0.0018 55.7 73.9 85.3 95.4 3368.91 0.336 0.0230 0.850 0.2104
2006 0.0005 37.6 59.8 71.4 82.3 1808.73 0.180 0.0064 0.633 0.0577
2007 0.0003 16.5 34.2 44.6 64.0 612.79 0.061 0.0035 0.242 0.0055
2008 0.0002 11.2 28.9 41.9 59.2 460.08 0.046 0.0042 0.157 0.0012
2009 0.0002 7.2 16.2 23.1 33.6 169.65 0.017 0.0010 0.141 0.0008
2010 0.0002 10.9 22.1 28.4 41.7 274.83 0.027 0.0014 0.239 0.0026
2011 0.0002 15.5 32.6 38.1 45.5 471.11 0.047 0.0014 0.394 0.0090
2012 0.0002 6.8 15.3 19.9 28.8 135.01 0.013 0.0011 0.181 0.0009
2013 0.0002 5.0 12.4 18.0 29.6 118.65 0.012 0.0010 0.100 0.0003
2014 0.0002 5.8 13.6 19.4 31.2 130.29 0.013 0.0011 0.119 0.0006
2015 0.0002 5.2 13.5 19.2 30.5 123.60 0.012 0.0011 0.113 0.0003
2016 0.0003 5.1 12.9 19.2 31.5 127.22 0.012 0.0013 0.099 0.0003
2017 0.0003 8.1 18.2 24.3 36.9 189.23 0.019 0.0015 0.179 0.0010
2018 0.0003 11.0 24.7 33.3 44.7 306.02 0.030 0.0017 0.229 0.0020
2019 0,0003 7.1 16.5 23.6 36.5 178.28 0.017 0.0019 0.132 0.0008two periods are distinguished: 2004–2007 and 2008–2018.
Thus, the first company by market share changes over time
(Acciona Solar S.A., between 2004 and 2008, Trina Solar S.L.
(Spain), in 2011, Aries Solar Termoelectrica S.L., from 2013
to 2016, and X-Elio Energy S.L. in 2009, 2010, 2012, 2017
and 2018).
- The evolution of HHI and HHIN shows the decrease in the
concentration rate in the sector. The market is now decon-
centrated (2007 is the turning point year). However, in
the years 2004–2005 the HHI exceeded the critical figure
of 1500. This shows that, until the implementation of in-
centive policies, it was a concentrated sector. In 2017 and
2018 there is an increase in the HHI and HHIN index. The
growth of the sector in recent years is due to two rea-
sons: the new legislative framework and the emergency
auction held by the Spanish government in 2017. This en-
ergy auction was carried out due to international pressure
over the failure to meet the European energy objectives for
2020 (Gürtler et al., 2019). It is estimated that the large
companies that participated will install 4000 MW of solar
energy (Fernández-González et al., 2020).
- The RHT, DI and K indices show that currently large com-
panies have no power over small ones. In other words, the
market power exercised by companies with a larger mar-
ket share has diminished considerably. Thus, the influence
of the leading companies on the prices, production and
strategies of the remaining companies is reduced. The DI
in 2004 had a value of 0.969, which indicated that it was a
market with a high degree of concentration: large dominant
companies and great power over the rest. However, since
2007 there has been a large decrease in the value of the RHT,
ID and K indexes. In order to understand the behavior of
these indices, it is necessary to describe the two key points
of the economic-legal environment since 2007:
◦ The Spanish financial system facilitated the entry of
small investors into the photovoltaic sector. For this
purpose, Project Finance were created as micro-
companies, in which financial expenses were covered
through the premiums received (del Río and Mir-
Artigues, 2012).
◦ Cheaper and more efficient photovoltaic technology
also benefited the more modest investors. Photovoltaic
technology was a barrier to entry into the sector for
small and micro businesses at the beginning of the294521st century. The new solar modules can be grouped
into small parks, making themmore accessible to small
investors (del Río and Mir-Artigues, 2012).
Concerning the sector stability analysis, the evolution of the sec-
tor reflects the financial crisis and the process of legislative re-
form. The results of stability are highly linked to contestability,
understood as the direct relationship between entry and exit bar-
riers and competition in the industry. If we take into account the
regulatory changes, it can be said that the restrictions on activity
in this sector are very high. As shown in previous studies (Bikker
et al., 2007), contestability variables explain market competition.
In other words, the greater the appeal of the investment environ-
ment, the greater the degree of competition. This justifies stability
parameters, through concentration rates.
The main stability indicators in the Spanish PV sector were
analyzed:
- Between 2004 and 2017, 5308 companies entered the mar-
ket (1670 in 2007), while 1694 companies left it. That is, the
market has increased by 3551 companies since 2004. Since
2010, more companies have left the market than entered it.
The reduction in the number of companies in the last seven
years is due to the extinction of small companies which,
with the reduction of premiums, were no longer profitable.
- The index of instability and volatility shows higher values
since the elimination of the feed-in tariff system (year 2012).
The high premiums offered by the legislation passed since
2007 attracted new companies to the market. This made
the competitive position of some companies change. A small
increase in instability can be observed from 2016 onwards.
This is due to the fact that some of the large companies are
regaining market share (e.g. Acciona S.A.) and large compa-
nies are entering the market. Most of the new companies
that have entered the market have their core business in the
construction sector (e.g. ACS S.A., Sacyr S.A. or Avintia S.L.)
- The period 2005–2008 (see Table 2) stands out for being
highly dynamic (see data on gross entry rates and rotation
rate). As of 2010, negative values have been observed in the
net entry rate, which shows the loss of appeal of the sector.
The evolution of the net entry rate reflects the sensitivity of
the sector to change. The passing of RD 1003/2010 (Spanish
Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2010a) and
RD-L 14/2010 (Spanish Head of State, 2010) has led to a
drastic reduction in the entry of companies (See Table 2).

























































2004 74 11 0.192 164.44% 24.444% 140.00% 71.4%
2005 462 37 0.213 388.24% 31.092% 357.14% 91.7%
2006 1428 16 0.274 262.50% 2.941% 259.56% 73.8%
2007 1670 16 0.141 85.38% 0.818% 84.56% 46.7%
2008 1333 147 0.249 36.93% 4.072% 32.85% 30.9%
2009 163 111 0.111 3.40% 2.314% 1.08% 5.7%
2010 117 123 0.149 2.41% 2.537% −0.12% 5.0%
2011 24 68 0.177 0.50% 1.404% −0.91% 1.9%
2012 24 184 0.057 0.50% 3.835% −3.33% 4.5%
2013 4 63 0.046 0.09% 1.358% −1.27% 1.5%
2014 4 219 0.050 0.09% 4.783% −4.70% 5.1%
2015 3 86 0.036 0.07% 1.971% −1.90% 2.1%
2016 2 336 0.072 0.05% 7.849% −7.80% 8.6%
2017 0 218 0.092 0.00% 5.523% −5.52% 5.8%
2018 0 59 0.112 0.00% 1.582% −1.58% 1.6%













5. Conclusions and policy recommendations
Given the high dependence of the Spanish economy on fossil
nergy and the pressure from Europe to move towards a more
ustainable production model, Spanish policy makers built an in-
entive policy to improve the appeal of renewable energies, with
pecial attention to photovoltaic energy. In Spain, an incentive
olicy for renewable energies, especially photovoltaic energy, was
uilt due to the high dependence of the Spanish economy on
ossil energy and the pressure from Europe for a more sustainable
roductive model.
In the global context, the role of the Spanish State as a reg-
latory agent is fundamental to promoting renewable energies.
or this reason, in the period 2004–2007 there was a legislative
hange that ended with the passing of RD 661/2007 (Spanish
inistry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, 2007). The insti-
utional framework of the 2004–2007 period led to large invest-
ents. During that period, the sector’s year-on-year growth rates
eached over 300%. The empirical study carried out in this paper
hows that during the ‘‘boom’’ of the photovoltaic sector the
evel of concentration decreased, reaching levels of perfect com-
etition. The results of the production rates and net entry rates
how the excessive growth of this industry. In the period 2006–
008, more than 4400 companies entered the sector. Most of the
ompanies that entered the sector were small firms. This is due
o three causes: the Spanish government’s policy of bonuses, the
eduction in technological costs and the project finance for small
nvestors created by the Spanish financial sector (Mir-Artigues,
013).
The high indebtedness of the Spanish economy caused a
hange in the premium policy from 2008 onwards. In the period
004–2007 the Spanish government invested more than 6 billion
uros in support of photovoltaic energy production. In a scenario
f economic crisis, it was not possible to carry on with the
ncentive policy. Therefore, in 2012, RD-L 1/2012 (Spanish Head
f State, 2012) was passed and the feed-in tariffs system was
liminated (Álvarez-Díaz et al., 2017). This caused the number
f market entries to decrease, while the number of exits in-
reased. The lower profitability led to the exit of small companies.
lthough the total number of companies decreased, there was
o decrease in competition. In fact, since 2006 the degree of
oncentration in the sector has not been high.
The values of the rotation index and the instability and volatil-
ty index showed stagnation of the sector during the period
012–2017. However, from 2017 onwards, the market share of
he first 10 firms increased, as did the value of the remaining m
2946concentration indices. Evidence of this is that the value of the
HHI index more than doubled, as did the C1, C2 or DI indexes.
This increase in the values of the indices shows the beginning of
a new ‘‘boom’’ in Spanish photovoltaic production. There is no
dominant entity in the PV power generation sector in Spain, and
the leading entity in terms of market share is changing during
the period analyzed. The number of institutions has stabilized
since 2008, due to the lack of economic stimulus. The degree of
concentration is nowadays very low according to the indicators
analyzed, corresponding to a deconcentrated and competitive
sector. This situation of low concentration is the result of the
introduction of incentive policies in 2007. While the first pho-
tovoltaic boom was led by small companies, this second boom
is linked to larger companies. The large companies in the market
have increased their production. The new institutional framework
is more beneficial for large companies. The elimination of the
‘‘sun tax’’, the passing of RD-L 15/2018 (Spanish Head of State,
2018) and the international context where a more ecological
economic paradigm is being sought, have led to the reactivation
of photovoltaic energy in Spain.
The process of institutional change in our case study corre-
sponds to an institutional change marked by the political action
of the government and the legislative action of the parliament,
so we refer to a ‘‘top-down’’, centralized institutional change that
is marked by collective action determined in laws and royal de-
crees (Álvarez-Díaz et al., 2017). The change of incentive policies
to a sector reduces the return on investments in that sector,
and as these investments once made cannot have any other
purpose than the generation of PV power, a hold-up problem
analogous to the one defined for the transactional economic
theory of the firm is detected (Fernández-González et al., 2020).
his case study serves as an example for decision-makers on
ow to assess possible future scenarios in the legislative design
rocess of a sector. With the repeal of bonus schemes by the
ighest legislative authority in the country, a hold-up problem
s created. In this way, due to legal uncertainty, a bad precedent
or attracting investment is created.
It is important to realize that the so-called ‘‘green economy’’ is
he new economic model for the European Union, of which Spain
s a member. This growth strategy, already promoted previously
y this supranational organization through the 20/20/20 Plan,
as become increasingly important in Europe. Spain, with the
ackground to its energy policy and the cancellation of the feed-
n tariffs system, may find itself at a comparative disadvantage,
ven with its suitable biophysical conditions, compared to other
ember states.




















Inverse number of entities (R) R =
1
N
N: number of companies in the sector
This index will be equal to 1 in the case of a monopoly, and
will tend to 0 as the number of companies increases. This
indicator does not provide information on the relative or
absolute size of firms in the market; however, when studied
over a time series it indicates the entry or exit of firms in the
market.






k: number of the main market entities
Si: market share of the ith company (in order
of highest to lowest)
This index allows to understand the market share of the main
k companies in the market. The number k is selected by the
researcher, there is no rule for his choice. The index weighs
equal to the largest k companies, but does not take into







N: number of companies in the sector
Si market share of the ith company (in order
of highest to lowest)
The HHI gives more weight to the larger companies. The
maximum value of the HHI is 10,000, monopoly case.
According to the US Department of Justice and The Federal
Trade Commission, the market concentration varies based on
the following levels:
– HHI < 100: Very competitive market.
– 100 ≤ HHI < 1500: Deconcentrated market
– 1500 ≤ HHI < 2500: Concentrated market.






N: number of companies in the sector
HHI: Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
The value of HHI-S is 0 when the concentration is minimum
(very large number of companies in the sector) and 1 when
the concentration is maximum (monopoly case).









N: number of companies in the sector
Si: market share of the ith company (in order
of highest to lowest)
i: rank of the i-one entity in the industry.
This index includes all the companies in the sector and takes
into account the relative size of each one when ordering them
from highest to lowest. However, unlike the HHI, the RHT
index assigns greater importance to small businesses in the
sector. The minimum value this index is 1/n (close to 0) when
the number of entities in the industry is very high and the
concentration is very low. The maximum value of index 1
(monopoly).







N: number of companies in the sector
Si: market share of the ith company (in order
of highest to lowest)
HHI: Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
The DI measures the market concentration from the
contribution of each entity to the HHI index. The value of the
DI varies between 0 and 1. Values close to 0 are indicative of
atomized sector. The DI reaches a higher value the smaller the
non-dominant firms, indicating a greater ability of the
dominant firm to exercise dominance over the remaining
firms.




N: number of companies in the sector
Si: market share of the ith company (in order
of highest to lowest)
Si+1: market share of the entity immediately
following in size
For the calculation of this index, the market shares must be
ordered from highest to lowest. The Kwoka index analyzes the
uniformity or dispersion of the companies’ size. When the
inequality between the size of companies is high, the
dominance of the main companies increases and the value of
the index rises. The value of K shall be between 0 and 1,
where 1 is the value corresponding to a monopoly.However, the results show that the sector has achieved some
egree of stability on the supply side. In this framework, the
olicymakers could implement demand-side incentives such as
ncreased subsidies to improve energy efficiency and renewable
nergy in the envelope of buildings, heating, air conditioning,
entilation and sanitary hot water facilities, lighting facilities,
nd electric vehicle charging facilities. These incentives would
e a great support in the return on investment needed. And all
his would allow for faster reaching the greenhouse gas reduc-
ion targets set by the EU in the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable
evelopment and against climate change.
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Annex. Concentration and stability ratesSee Tables A.1 and A.2.























N: number of companies in the sector
Si1 and Si2: market share of the ith entity in
periods 1 and 2 respectively
Range of values between 0 and 1. If I = 0 all companies kept their
competitive position constant and therefore the level of competition is
very low. If I = 1 the level of instability is maximum and the degree of
competition is very high.
Gross entry rate GEntryRt =
NEt
Nt−1
NEt : number of companies entering the sector
in the period t
Nt−1: number of companies in the sector in
the period prior to t
The index has the following interpretation (linked to the stage of the
life cycle of the sector)
– GEntryR = 0: No companies have entered the sector.
– GEntryR close to 0: The entry of new companies to the sector is
reduced
– GEntryR close to 1: The number of new companies is similar to the
total number of existing companies in the previous period.
– GEntryR > 1: The number of companies entering the sector is higher
than the number of companies established in the sector in the previous
period. Very dynamic sector with high volatility.
This indicator does not consider the number of companies that could
have been destroyed in the period t
Gross exit rate GExitRt =
NLt
Nt−1
NLt : Number of companies leaving the sector
in the period t
Nt−1: number of companies in the sector in
the period prior to t
Similar interpretation to that of the previous index (closely linked to
the stage of the life cycle of the sector):
– GExitR = 0: No companies left in period t .
– GExitR close to 0: The exit of companies is reduced
– GExitR close to 1: The number of companies leaving the sector is
similar to the total number of companies in the previous period.
– GExitR > 1: The number of companies leaving the sector is higher
than the number of companies established in the sector in the previous
period. Very dynamic sector with high volatility.
Net entry rate
NEntryRt =
(GEntryRt − GExitRt ) × 100
The indicator is interpreted as a percentage:
– NEntryR = 0: There has been no change in the number of companies
in the sector. The number of entries is equal to the number of exits.
– NEntryR > 0: GEntryR is greater than GExistR. Indicative of a dynamic
sector that attracts new competitors
– NEntryR < 0: GEntryR is less than GExistR. Unattractive sector
The higher the value of the indicator (in absolute terms) the greater the
instability of the sector
Market rotation rate RMt =
NEt + NLt
Nt
NEt : number of companies entering the sector
in the period t
NLt : number of companies leaving the sector
in the period t
Nt : number of companies in the sector in the
period t
If RM tends to 0 the sector’s turnover is low. If RM tends to 1 the
sector’s turnover is high, which would imply a higher level of
instability.References
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